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Three years after Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi 
declared his ‘Caliphate’, the so-called Islamic
State (IS) appears in terminal decline. Its 
territory, which once stretched from the Syrian-
Turkish border to the outskirts of Kirkuk and
Baghdad, has been gradually cleaved. In
Syria, the US-sponsored Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), a coalition of militia dominated
by the Kurdish Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or
Democratic Union Party (PYD), have taken
huge swathes of northern Syria back from 
IS and besieged the Caliphate’s capital, 
Raqqa. Independently of this, forces loyal to 
Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, backed by
his allies Russia and Iran, charged back into 
central Syria in spring-summer 2017, retaking
Palmyra and reaching the provincial capital of
Deir-Es-Zour. Though IS forces remain in
Syria’s east along the Euphrates into Iraq, their
long-term survival seems unlikely and the
days of the Caliphate being a major player in
the Syrian civil war appear over. 
Neither Assad, the SDF, nor their international
backers will take the task of finishing IS off for
granted, but inevitably thoughts are turning to
what happens next and what IS’ decline
means for the Syria conflict. Both Russia and
the US justified entering the Syria war as a
means to defeat IS; will either or both remain
even after it is gone? More significantly, how
will their two Syrian allies, Assad and the SDF,
now facing each other either side of the 
Euphrates, respond? Could local or inter-
national factors prompt a new conflict in 
former IS territory between the two victors or is
some form of compromise on the cards?
Moreover, does IS’ territorial defeat actually
mean its complete removal from the Syrian
war, or might remnants and supporters 
continue to be a thorn in both Assad 
and the Kurds’ side? This article will 
explore these key domestic and international 
questions emerging from IS’ decline in Syria.
By considering the conflicting goals and 
priorities of the two main Syrian forces and
their external backers, as well as the remnants
of IS, it will argue that though the Caliphate
may have been defeated, new conflicts and 
instability may yet emerge from the fallout.
I. A ssad ’s  reconqu is ta
Summer 2017 saw Assad’s Syrian Arab Army
(SAA) and allied militia storm eastwards
across the desert, capturing former IS-held
areas at a pace unseen in the previous six
years of war. There were two main drivers for
this. In Syria’s west, the war with the main-
stream rebels was diminishing. After receiving
a huge military boost from Russia and Iran,
Assad had punctured any last rebel hopes of
victory by recapturing eastern Aleppo in 
December 2016, enabled by a volte face from
Turkey against the opposition after cutting a
deal with Moscow. Thereafter the opposition
were cajoled into accepting first a ceasefire
and then a Russia-Turkey-Iran plan for 
several opposition-held ‘de-escalation zones’
in western Syria that the regime agreed not to
attack. With the ceasefire largely holding, 
despite a few regime violations, this freed up
Assad’s troops to head to the less strategically
important east. The second driver was the
rapid success of the SDF’s campaign against
IS. On the one hand, the Kurdish-led assault
forced IS to focus on defending its capital,
leaving more low hanging fruit for relatively
small regime units to pick off. On the other
hand, Assad and his allies, especially Iran,
feared the expansion of the SDF further into
former IS territory once Raqqa falls, possibly
giving the US access to much of Syria’s east.
These multiple factors led Assad to race for
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Deir-Es-Zour, part of which still contained a
besieged regime enclave. By September 
IS lines were breached and the siege 
lifted, opening the prospect of regime forces 
pushing all the way down the Euphrates to the
Iraqi border at Albukamal.
These successes were founded on a military
coalition whose component parts had a range
of goals in former IS territory. Assad, after 
battling over half a decade to stay in power, 
remains unwavering in his claim to all of Syria.
Grabbing easily-conquerable IS territory and
the resources it incorporates – including Deir-
Es-Zour’s oil fields, the fertile Euphrates 
valley and, potentially, the border posts of 
Albukamal, which would reopen Iraqi land
trade – was therefore a no brainer. Assad has
previously been accused of collaborating with
IS and certainly he facilitated their initial rise
by focussing more on the non-IS rebels in 
western Syria, allowing the Caliphate to 
thrive in the more peripheral east while 
simultaneously using its presence to claim that
all opposition were Jihadists. However, with
the rebels now effectively neutralised, IS  has
served its purpose, so Assad has no reason to
hold off, especially when he can then pose as
the conqueror of Jihadists and bringer of 
security to long-suffering domestic supporters.
More locally, fighting alongside Assad are
Sha'itat tribesmen, a group domestic to Syria’s
east who were brutally crushed by IS in 2014
and are seeking revenge.1
Also on the ground were Shia militia, mostly
from Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, supplied
by Damascus’ long-standing ally Iran, who also
provided some Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commanders.
Some commentators claimed the focus of the
regime’s eastward thrust was to secure Tehran
a land route that would connect Iran, via Iraq,
to the Mediterranean and its Hezbollah ally in
Lebanon.2 However, as Aymenn Al-Tamimi
notes, it already has a secure air route for
weapons supplies – far more reliable than the
militant-ridden roads – and so any land route
is primarily of symbolic value, especially given
the high profile fears it raises in Washington.3
More important is to deprive the US space in
eastern Syria. In May 2017 this fear had
prompted Iranian-sponsored militia to head
east to the Iraqi border to outflank US-backed
rebels based in the Syrian-Iraqi border town of
al-Tanf. Capturing as much of the east, 
especially Albukamal and its link to Iraq, is
likely Tehran’s priority. This is also a goal for
Assad’s other ally, Russia, whose Special
Forces and air force supported the eastern
campaign. While Moscow would also oppose
an expanded US presence in eastern Syria, it
primarily seeks the visible destruction of IS and
re-conquest by Assad. Like the US president
Donald Trump, his Russian counterpart
Vladimir Putin has invested considerable 
political capital in the war against IS, claiming
it as the main reason for intervening on Assad’s
side in 2015. While he has mostly directed his
forces against the rebels until now, high profile
defeats of IS such as the liberation of Palmyra
(twice) and Deir-es-Zour are important for his
domestic and international audiences. 
While the three allies are united in their desire
to ensure that Assad rather than the SDF take
as much former-Caliphate land as possible,
there is less clarity on what happens next.
Though Assad relies heavily on Russia and
Iran militarily and economically, he retains an
independent agenda and, indeed, has at times
played his patrons against one another to 
further it. All three appear to agree that they
will eventually target the rebel enclave of Idlib
in western Syria, currently dominated by Hayat
Tahrir as-Sham (HTS), formerly the al-Qaeda
aligned al-Nusra Front, although the timetable
and method is contested.4 However, there may
be less agreement on how to deal with the
SDF and the vast swathe of north-eastern
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Syria it will control if and when IS is gone. At
present there is a modus vivendi between
Assad’s forces and the Kurds, including the
continued presence of a PYD pocket in
Aleppo, but this may not last. Assad has
vowed to ‘liberate’ “every inch,” of Syria, 
describing the current PYD-led governance
bodies as “temporary structures”.5 Like IS, 
the Kurdish militia has played a useful role 
for Assad, fighting both the rebels and later 
IS, which has often lead to quiet regime-
PYD cooperation, but that use is finite. 
Any prolonged success for the SDF-PYD’s 
democratic federalist councils poses an 
ideological rival to Assad’s autocratic rule and
cannot be tolerated in the long term. The US
presence on Syrian soil that comes with it is a
further issue. Moreover, there remain enclaves
of regime rule, notably around Qamishli and a
pocket of Hassakeh, which might justify a 
future military thrust into ‘Rojava’.
However, whatever Assad’s ambitions, any 
military conquest is dependent on the US, 
Russia, and Iran. If the US maintains its aerial
and military presence in eastern Syria, it
seems unlikely Assad and his allies would
dare attack. For this reason the SDF hope for
a prolonged US presence, discussed further
below.6 As has been seen in the thrust east,
even if the US declines to defend the Kurds,
Assad requires Russian and Iranian military
support to conquer. Russia has shown itself
ambivalent towards the Kurds. It has sought
to co-opt the PYD, sending a military mission
to Afrin – the only Syrian Kurdish territory 
without a US presence. It also proposed a new
constitution that included Kurdish autonomy
within a federal Syria during the Astana peace
talks in January 2017, swiftly rejected by
Assad. Yet Moscow’s commitment to the PYD
seems transient. The mission to Afrin was
likely a means to irritate Turkey, who regard
the PYD as terrorists, during a period of 
Turkish-Russian hostility. Once relations 
were repaired and Ankara mooted invading 
the Kurdish enclave, the mission withdrew.
Moscow has long advocated maintaining Syria
as a territorially integral state. While it would
therefore still prefer to find a diplomatic 
means of bringing SDF territory back under 
Damascus’ sway, if this proves impossible it
may eventually approve an Assad incursion,
especially if endorsed by its new friend Turkey.
Iran, which would provide ground troops for
any fighting, is also in a quandary. Unlike 
Russia it has shown less attachment to the 
territorial integrity of Syria, backing sub-state
militia and prioritising fighting for areas of 
military importance to it and Hezbollah. The
Kurdish-led region is not an immediate priority,
but in the long term, permanent autonomy or
even independence worries Tehran, fearing 
it could inspire its own sizeable Kurdish 
population or those in Iraq, now a key Iranian
ally. Yet those same Kurdish constituents
make it difficult for the IRGC to support any
Assad invasion – far more inflammatory than
fighting ‘terrorists’ like the rebels and IS. Iran
then too would likely push for a diplomatic 
solution, but the determinant might yet be the
US. If the US retains its presence or even 
attacks Iranian-sponsored forces, as it did in
May 2017 near al-Tanf, Tehran could more
easily present the SDF as US proxies and
launch attacks in the name of pushing ‘The
Great Satan’ back.7
II. The  K u rds ’ uncerta in  fu tu re  
The SDF’s parallel advance against IS was
also built on an uneasy coalition of Syrian
Kurds, Arabs and the US. The key was the 
alliance between the PYD and the US, forged
after the former’s militia, the YPG, fought IS in
a heroic defence of Kobane in 2014.8 The 
high profile battle provoked US interest, 
illuminating a secular and effective indigenous
militia that they could back to take on IS on the
5 McDowell, Aleppo district shows Assad's delicate dance with Kurds, 2017.
6 Davison, U.S. forces to stay in Syria for decades, 2017.
7 Bazzi, The Growing U.S.-Iran Proxy Fight in Syria, 2017.
8 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, 2016, 211.
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ground. The SDF was formed in 2015 partly
as a means to legitimise American sponsor-
ship: Washington did not want to rile Turkey or
be seen to be backing just a Kurdish group, so 
encouraged the formation of a wider umbrella
organisation including anti-IS Arab militia,
even if the PYD dominated. This partnership
has been the main reason for the decline of IS
in Syria. By April 2017 the US had launched
8,772 separate airstrikes on IS positions in
Syria, with its international partners adding a
further 415.9 Armed and trained by the 
Pentagon, the SDF then advanced south-
wards, capturing a string of IS-held towns: Tal
Abyad, Tishreen, Manbij and Tabqa – the 
latter with the help of US Special Forces. In
May 2017, in a controversial move as part of 
election promise to step up the anti-IS 
campaign, new president Donald Trump
armed the YPG directly for the first time, not
via the SDF. Though this risked Turkish ire, it
had immediate results, with the YPG leading
the encirclement of Raqqa in June.
Yet as with Assad and his allies, the 
components of the SDF-US alliance have 
contrasting goals and concerns for the post-IS
future. Its enemies, especially Turkey, charge
that the PYD’s ultimate goal is Kurdish 
independence: the secession of Syria’s 
Kurdish regions and unity with other Kurds in
Turkey, Iraq and Iran. When the PYD declared
the region autonomous in November 2013 and
named it ‘Rojava’ – Kurdish for ‘West’, 
implying it was the western region of greater
Kurdistan – such fears seemed justified. They
also argue that the PYD, which is ideologically 
aligned with Turkey’s secessionist PKK, is 
autocratically Marxist, closing down any real
opposition within Kurdish and newly acquired
Arab territory. Their ‘Kurdification’ of some 
territories, imposing the Kurdish language in
schools, not unlike the enforced Arabisation of
Kurdish areas by the Assad regime in the past,
has similarly sparked accusations of cultural
colonisation.10 The PYD itself argues that it is
neither secessionist nor dictatorial, prioritising
instead protecting Syria’s Kurds from the 
ravages of war, and promoting its grass-roots
democratic system of local government within
a reformed federal Syria.11 The decision to 
rename ‘Rojava’ into the less confrontational
‘Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria’
in December 2016 would support this. The
true motives are hard to ascertain, and there
may be a degree of pragmatism at work.
When Rojava was first declared, the Syrian
state and Assad’s rule looked close to 
collapse, while the PYD had to contest with
both Kurdish rivals and rebel forces, so 
promoting independence may have made
sense to both justify its expansion and brand
itself. By 2016, with the reality dawning 
that Assad may not fall and now utterly 
dependent on the US militarily, moderating 
its slogans to emphasise its democratic nature
to Washington and its Syrian nature to 
Damascus may have been a tactic to hedge
its bets in the changing environment. Yet 
this ideological flexibility increased mistrust 
towards the PYD, especially from its Syrian
Arab allies, still uncertain of the Kurds’ true 
intent as they expand.
Syria’s Kurds made up roughly 10% of the 
pre-war Syrian population, and only formed 
a majority in the north-east and north-west 
corners along the border with Turkey and 
Iraq. More and more of the territory captured
from IS was therefore Arab-dominated, with
some having no Kurdish presence at all. This
raised questions about the PYD’s future role
in these conquered areas from the Arabs
within the SDF. According to the Pentagon, of
the roughly 50,000 fighters in the SDF, less
than half are from Arab militias, and the 
forward positions are dominated by the
27,000-strong YPG.12 Similarly, while the PYD
emphasises the representative nature of its
ruling councils, Arabs complain that the reality
9 Airwars, Number of airstrikes by US and Allies, 2017.
10 Balanche, From Qamishli to Qamishlo, 2017.
11 Sherko, Northern Syria’s New Democratic Federal System, 2017.
12 Kenner and O’Toole, The Race to Raqqa Could Cost Trump Turkey, 2017.
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is Kurdish dominance. The council set up in
Manbij, for example, gave Arab leaders grand
titles and a nominal share in power, but in 
reality decision-making remained with the
PYD.13 When the SDF announced its intention
for a similar representative council in Raqqa,
Arab tribal leaders expressed scepticism and
concern that this would be a means to expand
PYD influence.14 External forces seeking 
to undermine the PYD or its US allies could 
yet exploit such Arab hostility towards 
the Kurds. In 2016, when Turkey invaded
northern Syria to prevent the PYD from linking
up Manbij with Afrin, it successfully lured 
one Arab militia leader within the SDF, Abdul 
Karim Obeid, and several dozen of his men
over to their side. While Arab tribal leaders 
in eastern Syria profess a hatred for both
Assad and IS, frustration at PYD over-
reach might yet push some into machinations
on their behalf. 
The US is arguably the keystone in the anti-
IS alliance. Without it, the PYD and Arab tribes
would not likely have put aside historical 
antagonisms, nor would the SDF have so 
effectively pushed back the Caliphate. While
the US physical presence is relatively modest
– a few thousand Special Forces, an air base
in Kobane, and nine other reported sites in
SDF-held territory – its control of the skies acts
as a protective shield to its predominately 
Kurdish allies.15 As the Caliphate shrinks, 
Washington’s long-term intentions are not just
a determining factor for the Arabs and Kurds 
in the SDF, but also condition the response 
of Assad, Russia and Iran towards north-
eastern Syria. The US faces a tough choice. 
Maintaining a ground and aerial presence 
indefinitely will guard against any possible
resurgence from IS or similar Jihadists. It
would also likely deter Russia, Assad, and –
most importantly – Iran from expanding their 
influence, and it could similarly act as a 
forward base to check Iranian ambitions in 
the Levant. However, at the same time it would
place even greater strain on its ties with 
key NATO ally Turkey, possibly pushing it 
further into the arms of Russia; it would be 
the kind of open-ended military commitment
Trump and his nationalist domestic supporters
are strongly against. It might also lead to 
the permanent partition of Syria in the 
same way that the post-1991 no-fly zone in
northern Iraq paved the way for Kurdish 
autonomy there, and it would come with a 
degree of responsibility for what takes place
on the ground.16
Commentators in Washington have urged
Trump one way or the other, but the un-
certainty is felt most keenly by the Kurds.17
The White House has a history of selling the
Kurds out, and the PYD fear the same will
happen once they have outlived their 
usefulness in the battle with IS.18 The White
House’s decision to cut support for the 
mainstream rebels in July 2017 does not set
a good precedent. Already the PYD have 
refused limited US efforts to develop an 
independent, non-Kurdish dominated Arab
force to head off Assad’s advances east of
Deir-es-Zour – to ensure that they are the only
option for Washington.19 Even so, the prospect
of American abandonment, despite SDF 
pleading, remains large.20 Fears of Turkey 
remain the greatest, hence the possibility of
reaching an accommodation with Russia and
the regime. However, as discussed above,
were the US to leave, Assad would have 
little incentive to respect any compromise 
in the long term. 
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III. J ihad ism  re loaded?
While Assad, the SDF, and their external allies
look likely to dominate the post-IS Syrian 
landscape, this does not mean that former 
supporters of the ‘Caliphate’ will simply 
disappear. For one thing, clearing the final IS 
fighters from Raqqa and along the Euphrates
may take time and prove challenging, although
at the current rate most expect the areas to
eventually be conquered. Yet military defeat
will remove neither the ideology of Jihadism,
nor the resentment among long-repressed 
Syrian Sunnis that drew some to embrace IS.
With neither Assad nor the PYD likely to give
any real power to this constituency aside from
token leadership roles, there is every reason 
to suggest Jihadism will continue to gain 
followers – especially if IS is able to present
both the Ba’ath regime and the Kurds as
agents of foreign non-(Sunni) Muslim powers.
The prospect of a Jihadi backlash against both
the SDF and Assad therefore remains, most
likely in the form of lone terror attacks in
Assad’s Syria, Rojava, and in the countries 
that back them. That said, as seen by the rise
of IS after the withdrawal of US support for 
the Awakening Councils in Iraq, structural
shifts, such as the departure of American or
Russian forces, could yet prompt another 
Jihadist entity to emerge.
It is also possible that the main beneficiary of
IS’ decline is Syria’s other leading Jihadists,
Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS). Affiliated with 
al-Qaeda until 2016, when it underwent a
somewhat suspect rebranding, the group 
formerly known as al-Nusra Front emerged as
the main force in the rebel-held Idlib province
on the other side of Syria in summer 2017.21
Some have posited that IS’ collapse may lead
to a rapprochement between its followers 
and HTS, having split and fought one another
in 2013-14, although others note that this 
historical animosity alongside differences 
in approach make such a reconciliation 
improbable.22 More likely is that HTS emerges
as the last viable anti-Assad Jihadist move-
ment and attracts former IS supporters from
outside of its Idlib stronghold. HTS has long
presented itself as more Syrian-focused than
its transnational IS rivals, a more modest goal
that might increase in appeal as the IS dream
of a border-destroying Caliphate disappears.
Importantly, the return of Assad’s rule over 
eastern Syria, without any suggestion of real
reform and greatly aided by foreign powers, 
will boost the Jihadist narrative that Assad is
an agent of the West and Russia, without
whom IS would not have been destroyed. 
With all the focus on destroying the physical
Caliphate and no attempt made to tackle or
challenge its ideology, the phenomenon 
appears far from over in Syria or elsewhere. 
IV. C onc lus ion
In conclusion then, the looming physical de-
feat of IS may end one component of Syria’s 
conflict, but raises the prospect of opening 
others. In the medium term, the status of SDF-
controlled north eastern Syria could be
provocative. Given Assad’s determination to
retake “every inch” of lost territory, and the 
ideological threat presented by both Kurdish
autonomy and the purportedly democratic 
nature of the PYD’s governance structures, he
is unlikely to tolerate permanent SDF rule. Yet
his allies Russia and Iran would need to back
any conquest and both have cause to pursue
diplomatic reconciliation with the Kurdish-
dominated region before military options.
Given Assad’s past record, he may entertain
such a compromise but with the long term goal
of undermining it and asserting full control, or
frustrate all such efforts to push his allies 
into eventual military action. Either way, the 
determining factor actually remains the US,
whose presence would make any reconquest
difficult, hence the SDF’s attempts to secure 
its long-term presence. However, with a 
history of the US selling out the Kurds, the
21 Lund, Black flags over Idlib, 2017.
22 Bunzel, The Islamic State will Survive, 2017.




PYD find themselves in a difficult position: re-
lying on an unreliable ally remaining, or 
seeking favourable terms with Russia in 
the hope it can reign in Assad. Thrown into 
this is the unpredictability of the current US 
administration, already showing itself to favour
short-term ‘wins’ over long-term strategy. This
opens the prospect of sudden unpredictable
moves, such as a full withdrawal from eastern
Syria, or an escalation that might provoke an
Iranian or even Russian reaction.
In the long term, moreover, the root causes of
Syria’s uprising remain unsolved: Assad 
appears unwilling to grant concessions along-
side his reconquest, while north-eastern 
Arabs seem resentful of PYD domination. 
As such, there remains the prospect that 
irate populations may rise up again, against 
Assad, the Kurds, or their Russian, Iranian,
and American patrons, no doubt with eager 
external backers, happy to frustrate their 
regional rivals. This may also take the form of
a Jihadist resurgence. Despite IS’ collapse,
groups such as HTS and other Jihadists, 
possibly successors to IS, may still feed off 
the lingering resentment among oppressed
Syrian Sunnis. The ‘Caliphate’ may be about
to be conquered, but peace and stability look 
a long way off yet for Syria.
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